Catch the Tiger by its Tail: by Maxwell, Simon
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with a narrow question,
the evaluation of counterpart funds generated by
programme aid. 'Counterpart funds' are variously
defined , as we shall see, but are here taken broadly
to refer to local currency generated by the sale of
aid commodities or foreign exchange received as
aid by recipient countries. Counterpart funds have
been central to the debate on programme aid at
least since the Marshall Plan (Singer et al. 1987,
Bruton and Hill 1991, Owens 1991, Maxwell (ed.)
1992), but probably for the wrong reasons: they
do not represent additional resources over and
above the commodities or foreign exchange pro-
vided as aid, so that exclusive concentration on
counterpart funds may divert attention from the
impact of real resource transfers. Counterpart
funds represent, in fact, only the tail of the tiger.
The disproportionate prominence of counterpart
funds is a conundrum. However, as Clay (1995:
357) suggests, it may result less from their intrinsic
importance than from the opportunity to provide
'measurable performance criteria for purposes of
accountability that can be monitored by public
audit bodies in donor countries'. This is not an
unfamiliar problem: we are too often tempted to
measure what is measurable rather than what is
important (Chambers 1983).
The limitations of the concept of counterpart funds
have become well understood in the literature and
in donor guidelines (Section 2 below). This has
led donors to move away from tight earmarking
to more open-ended budget support, albeit not
universally or uniformly Here, however, we are
lacking an evaluation framework or a set of per-
formance criteria. At one level, these are unneces-
sary: the impact of counterpart funds is largely
synonymous with the impact of the programme
aid which generates them. At another level, how-
ever, it is useful to ask about the efficiency with
which counterpart funds are managed, including
their integration into the national budget. The
paper proposes performance criteria, particularly
for bilateral donors engaged in a delicate quadrille
around the budget with the recipient government
and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Section 3). If
performance criteria like these can be adopted, we
will be much closer to catching the tiger.
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Before turning to substantive issues, we need briefly
to pass by the definition of counterpart funds, and
sorne other issues of taxonomy A first point to
make is that the term 'programme aid' covers a
multitude of forms of assistance, with different leg
islative frameworks and different procedures.
Some generate local currency and some do not.
Programme aid may be provided in kind (food, fer-
tiliser, drugs), in foreign exchange tied to the pur-
chase of certain commodities (for example, in
Sectoral Import Programmes), or in untied foreign
exchange, restricted in use only by the provisions of
a 'negative list' of prohibited imports (for example,
in a General Import Programme). Debt relief also
counts as programme aid.
The DAC defines programme aid as 'all contributions
made available to a recipient country for general
development purposes ... not linked to specific pro-
ject activities' (OECD, quoted in Fell 1991: 54). It
distinguishes between four categories of programme
assistance: general programme assistance, like gen-
eral budget support; sector programme assistance,
directed to a particular sector; programme food aid;
and debt relief. White (1996) adopts a similar defi-
nition. He distinguishes particularly between budget
support, import support and debt relief.
Commodities or foreign exchange provided as pro-
gramme aid are not always sold, though usually
there should be a notional financial transaction.
Drugs, for example, may be passed directly to hos-
pitals, without any financial transaction being
entered in the budgets of the Ministries of Finance
or Health. Similarly, programme food aid is some-
times distributed directly to government mills or a
public distribution system for food grains. In both
these cases, there really should be an entry in the
budget. On the other hand, debt relief may not
generate a local counterpart fund and there need be
no budget entry Thus, programme aid generating
local currency is a sub-set of all programme aid.
A further narrowing in the literature has been to say
that 'counterpart funds' only exist where local cur-
rency generated from the sale of commodities or
foreign exchange remains partially under the con-
trol of the donor. Bruton and Hill's (1991) standard
definition, for example, is that counterpart funds
are 'local currency generated by the sale of aid com-
modities or foreign exchange in recipient countries,
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over the use of which the donor has some con-
trol' (emphasis added). Typically, counterpart
funds have been allocated to a separate account in
the Central Bank of the recipient country, and
released only with agreement of the donor, often
using the mechanism of a double-signature
account. On this definition, programme aid gener-
ating counterpart funds is a sub-set of programme
aid generating local currency
In practice, it may not be helpful to apply the
Bruton and Hill criterion too strictly As we shall
see below, donors have gradually moved since 1991
from highly restrictive earmarking to more open-
ended budget conditionality In these circum-
stances, they deliberately set out not to exercise
tight control over the local currency generated by
the sale of programme aid. Nevertheless, they still
talk about the local currency generated by pro-
gramme aid as counterpart funds. It seems sensible
for the formal definition to reflect current practice.
Whichever definition is used, it would be useful to
end this introduction with a statistical review of the
importance of counterpart funds (on different defi-
nitions) to different kinds of programme aid and to
programme aid as a whole. This is not possible
with the data available. Nevertheless, some indica-
tions are possible.
First, the importance of food aid is often neglected
in discussion about programme aid. In strictly
quantitative terms, programme aid is said to be a
growing area of assistance. Not so. If programme
food aid is included, total programme aid fell from
around 15 per cent of all aid in the mid-1970s, to
around 12 per cent in 1991-92 (OECD 1995). It
would be more correct, then, to say that financial
programme aid is a growing area of assistance. In
evaluating programme financïal aid, however, there
is much to be learned from earlier evaluations of
programme food aid, both about macroeconomic
impact and about management issues (Maxwell and
Singer 1979; Clay and Singer 1985; Clay and
Stokke 1991;Clay 1995; Owens 1996).
Second, the aggregate figures on programme aid
conceal substantial differences between donors and
recipients: in 1992, programme financial aid
accounted for 10 per cent of all aid overall, but for
as much as 27 per cent of Australian aid and 15 per
cent of that from the US (DAC 1995: E3-4).
Similarly, the share of financial programme aid in
total aid receipts in 1991 ranged from 12 per cent
for least developed countries, through 23 per cent
for lower middle income countries, to as much as
67 per cent for high income countries. There was
wide variation between countries, even within these
groups. For Pakistan and Chad, the figure was less
than 5 per cent; for Uganda, Egypt and Peru, it
exceeded 30 per cent (OECD 1993).
Third, similar variation is evident with regard to
counterpart funds (narrowly defined). No official
estimates are published on the aggregate share of
programme aid that generates counterpart funds,
but an estimate in 1991 was that between 3 and 12
per cent of all aid by DAC donors generated coun-
terpart funds (CPF) (Fell 1991). For some donors
and recipients, the figure is much higher: 10-15
per cent for the EU in 1991, 20 per cent in the
Sahel, as high as 60 per cent in Mozambique. These
are not necessarily high figures by historical stan-
dards. More than 40 per cent of Marhall Aid to
Europe after World War 2 consisted of food, feed
and fertiliser, most of which generated CPF (Singer
et al. 1987, Clay 1995).
2 An International Consensus:
Counterpart Fund Accounts
Should Not Exist
Programme aid has complicated effects, on foreign
exchange availability, resource flows, fiscal bal-
ances, monetary variables, and growth and income
distribution in the real economy In addition, pro-
gramme aid is usually a vehicle for policy condi-
tionality All these effects take place in economies
characterized by high inter-annual variability, and
usually over a period of several years. Evaluation is
of necessity equally complex.
There are two particular problems, both long famil-
iar from evaluations of programme food aid. First,
programme aid, like most aid, is fungible: hence,
the results cannot necessarily be estimated by look-
ing at the actual way aid is used. Secondly, a 'with
and without' comparison requires an estimate of the
counter-factual, since no control case is available.
In the case of counterpart funds, the issues debated
have included the additionality of counterpart
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funds and their appropriateness as a vehicle for pol-
icy conditionality; the impact of counterpart funds
on money supply and inflation; problems caused by
the overhang of unspent counterpart funds; and
problems of dependency when counterpart funds
amount to a sizeable proportion of the govemmerit
budget (see Owens 1991, Bruton and Hill 1991,
papers in Maxwell (ed.) 1992, Gazzo and
Mathonnat 1993).
The basic macroeconomics of counterpart funds are
well understood. In the first round, the sale of
commodities or foreign exchange is deflationary,
because it removes purchasing power from the
economy By contrast, the expenditure of counter-
part funds increases the demand for goods and ser-
vices and is reflatiodary. If these two effects happen
simultaneously, their effects cancel out. However, if
there is a lag, the expenditure of counterpart funds
can be destabilizing. If a large unspent balance
accumulates, it may become impossible to spend
CPF without breaching monetary targets. They
may then have to be written off, usually against
public debt (Maxwell 1992).
Practical guidelines follow from this understanding.
A workshop was held at the IDS in January 1991, at
a time when many donors were reviewing their pol-
icy on counterpart funds. The meeting agreed a
summary statement of principles, reproduced in
Figure 1. It stresses that counterpart funds are not
an additional resource, over and above the com-
modity or foreign exchange transferred as pro-
gramme aid. The key, first step is for donors and
recipients to agree on the strategic objectives of
policy, and on the policies, programmes and pro-
jects required. If agreement is reached, then the
statement implies that separate counterpart funds
will not be needed. If they are set up, however, cer-
tain principles should be followed: they should
be planned in advance, fully accounted in the
national budget, and subject to the normal budget
formulation, accounting, monitoring and evalua-
tion procedures.
The extent to which these guidelines have perco-
lated into donor policy can be assessed through the
policy statements of a sample of donors. The DAC
agreed guidelines on programme aid in December
1991, which incorporated similar principles. They
also emphasized the 'consolidated, rational and
38
Figure 1 Counterpart funds: a revised statement of principles
1 Counterpart funds consist of local currency generated by the sale of aid
communities or foreign exchange in recipient countries, over the use of which
the donor has some control.
2 The purpose of most aid which results in counterpart funds is to assist the
recipient country in meeting agreed strategic objectives, through carrying out
specific policies, programmes and projects. The strategic objectives are likely to
include poverty alleviation and food security, as well as stabilization and
structural adjustment.
3 Both the provision of aid and the use, when appropriate, of counterpart
funds, provide opportunities for dialogue over the size and composition of
government expenditure, with due allowance for fungibility of budgets. In
addition, the planning, use and monitoring of counterpart funds will require
attention to policies on poverty alleviation, taxation, commodity pricing, and
macroeconomic and sector policy, in order to maximize the benefit of aid and
avoid the risk of dependency and disincentives. However, government policy,
including policy on government expenditure, should not be developed as an
adjunct to aid or counterpart funds - the reverse is the case.
4 The real resource transfers are represented by the commodity or financial
aid inflows, not the counterpart funds. However, counterpart funds do constitute
a mechanism for translating payments for imported goods and services into
government revenue, for use on agreed programmes and projects. They may
be especially appropriate if it is desirable to target or otherwise influence
government expenditure.
5 The expenditure of counterpart funds will set in motion a process of
expansion of demand for and production of a varied basket of commodities. For
this reason, a diversified basket of aid commodities, including consumer goods,
is necessary to help fill any deficit in commodity balances.
6 Dialogue on policy issues and budget expenditure will be especially
important when the total (commodity) aid/counterpart fund package supplied by
all donors makes a sizeable contribution to commodity supply or the
government budget, at national or regional level. If it does not, then the
operating costs of counterpart funds are likely to outweigh the benefits.
7 The scope for efficient policy dialogue will be weakened if counterpart funds
are allowed to accumulate; or if they are eroded by inflation, implicit subsidies or
over-valued exchange rates. lt will be strengthened if counterpart funds are
predictable, regular, sizeable and adjusted to the inter-annual fluctuations of the
recipient countries
8 lt follows that where counterpart funds are appropriate they should be:
(a) planned ¡n advance, preferably in the context of a rolling, multi-year
agreement, linked to other aid and with the possibility of 'substitution actions'
on a year to year basis to ensure flexibility;
effective management of public expenditures' and
suggested that counterpart funds should therefore
be integrated into the national budget of the recipi-
ent government, under well-functioning budget
formulation, accounting and evaluation procedures'
(DAC 1992: para 287). However, the DAC recog-
nized that some donors were legislatively bound to
continue using separate counterpart fund account-
ing mechanisms, and recommended a 'transitional
phase' during which separate accounts would be
wound down (ibid. para 288).
The SPA donors established a working group on
counterpart funds, which agreed guidelines in
April 1991. These stated that 'the efficiency and
equity of public expenditure ... are to be achieved
by setting their level aid prioritizing their composi-
tion within a coherent framework of macroeco-
nomic and developmental objectives ... As progress
is achieved along these lines, the case for earmark-
ing CPF for specific uses decreases' (quoted in
Tincani 1991: 66).
EC/EU policy on counterpart funds was historically
different for food aid and financial programme aid.
In the former case, a Council Regulation of 1986
provided guidance on the use of counterpart funds,
tying them closely to the implementation of devel-
opment projects, sectoral actions or development
programmes. In the latter case, Article 226 of the
Lomé IV Convention prescribed that CPF be used
in a targeted way, listing various approved uses,
39
such as local costs of EC projects, specific budget
headings and measures to alleviate the costs of
structural adjustment. In May 1991, the EC
Development Council approved a Resolution on
CPF policy which set out a new interpretation of
policy for all counterpart funds (which did not,
however, supersede the Lomé Convention). The
Resolution stressed that counterpart funds 'consti-
tute resources which must be managed as part of
a single and consistent budgetary policy', and
referred to 'the need for the Community to strive
for greater coordination of budgetary policy with
the other providers of funds, in particular the
World Bank and the IMF' (EC 1991). These princi-
ples were reinforced in a Resolution on structural
adjustment in 1995, which called on the
Commission to 'move from targeting counterpart
funds towards more general allocation, as soon
as progress has been made in improving the effec-
tiveness of the monitoring instruments, program-
ming and budget implementation, and as regards
internalization of the reviews of public expenditure'
(EU 1995).
The US issued a Policy Determination on local cur-
rency in July 1991. This again stated that the
'important goal (is) an overall host country budget
that represents a sound development-oriented
macroeconomic policy framework' (USAID 1991: 3).
However, the policy also required the establishment
of a special account, wherever local currencies were
generated.
(b) disbursed in the context of an agreed policy framework, subject to
regular monitoring and fully accounted in the national budget of the recipient;
(e) credited without delay to a government-controlled interest-bearing
account at the full cif value, before subsidies or deductions;
disbursed quickly, following an agreed plan, to the agreed programme
and project spending accounts, including subsidies and domestic debt reduc-
tion where appropriate;
subject to the normal budget formulation, accounting, monitoring and
evaluation procedures on the financial and physical sides;
managed in ways minimizing the administrative load and strengthening
national planning, budgeting and reporting processes, perhaps on a multi-
donor basis through the creation of a common counterpart fund account.
Source: Maxwell and Owens (1991),
UK ODA policy was defined in a Technical Note
in 1991. This stated that 'it is ODAS general policy
not to exert any control over the use to which
counterpart funds are placed ... ODA programme
aid is generally provided in the context of an
IMF/IBRD adjustment programme which as one of
its components includes a review and agreement to
a public expenditure programme .. it is unneces-
sary and distortionary to attach any further condi-
tions ... (However) there may be instances where
the government's budgetary allocations are consid-
ered to be sub-optimal ... In such cases (tying)
should be sought' (ODA 1991: 38-9).
There are nuances between these different state-
ments, but they share a common emphasis on the
importance of the national policy making and bud-
get processes in the recipient countries. There is a
clear preference, certainly in the supra-national
policy guidelines, for phasing out separate CPF
accounts, and any form of earmarking. The earlier
EC/EU and the US statements are less enthusiastic
on this count. The approach favoured is to focus on
dialogue and conditionality over the budget, at
aggregate or sectoral level.
It is interesting that several of the guidelines or pol-
icy statements reviewed above could not quite bring
themselves to recommend the outright abolition of
CPF earmarking. This was partly because the
drafters foresaw some legislative difficulty in aban-
doning long-standing arrangements. There were
also more substantive reasons, however. Maxwell
reported from the 1991 workshop at IDS that 'a sur-
prising number
...
(saw) virtue in counterpart
funds, not only for donors, but also for recipients,
and especially in a second-best world characterized
by weak budgetary processes and, often, poor pol-
icy' (Maxwell 1991: 3). Counterpart fund accounts
could provide a way of protecting social expendi-
tures, channelling resouthes to the voluntary sector,
or guaranteeing minimal development effectiveness
in countries with poor budgetary procedures. It
was also felt by some donors that earmarking was
acceptable for small quantities of CPF: perhaps the
guidelines did not need to apply in full until a cer-
tain threshold was reached (Maxwell with Owens
1991; Maxwell 1992).
A more general point was that it would be difficult
to switch counterpart fund arrangements on and
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off, according to the changing quality of public
expenditure policy and management in different
countries. There might then be a case for CPF ear-
marking, on the grounds that it would be needed in
some countries in most years, and in most countries
in some years, and that a universal system might be
easier to impose than a piecemeal one (Maxwell
with Owens 1991: 17).
Some donors continue to express a modest enthusi-
asm for counterpart funds. For example, a recent dis-
cussion paper by SIDA (1996) argues that counterpart
funds contribute to the transparency, efficiency and
long-term sustainability of aid transactions.
These qualifications notwithstanding, there has
been a shift in the conventional wisdom and this
has important implications for evaluation. The two
alternative approaches are illustrated in two logical
frameworks (Figures 2 and 3), one for the case
where earmarking is favoured, the other where con-
ditionality takes place at the levels of policy and of
the budget. In the earmarking case (Figure 2), the
activities undertaken are much more specific and
identifiable, and donor-funded outputs can be eval-
uated. In the non-earmarking case (Figure 3), the
focus is instead on the quality of the policy making
and budget processes as a whole. As a result, the
indicators of success are very different. In the ear-
marking case, success is measured by the roads or
health centres built with counterpart funds. In the
non-earmarking case, success is measured by the
quality of the policy environment and the budget.
The risk factors or assumptions are also different:
in the first case, the risks lie in the realm of imple-
mentation delays or the external constraints to indi-
vidual projects; in the second case, in problems
with managing the budget.
3 Counterpart Funds and Public
Expenditure: a Performance
Check-List
The logical frameworks in Figures 2 and 3 provide a
platform for evaluating counterpart funds. In con-
ventional evaluation terminology, an impact evalua-
tion would be concerned with the achievement of the
overall objective and the purpose of the CPF; an effi-
ciency evaluation with the achievement of the results
or outputs; and an effectiveness evaluation with the
inputs and activities (CEC 1993; Norway 1993).
The general problems of evaluating programme aid
have been discussed by White (1996), in terms
which concentrate on measuring impact. It seems
sensible to conduct impact evaluation for programme
aid as a whole, and not to try and separate out
counterpart funds. Counterpart funds are only a
small part of the story and do not in themselves
represent additional resource transfers. It does
not make much sense to try and evaluate the
impact of CPF on growth or income distribution,
independently of the impact of the foreign
exchange or commodities which are real resources.
What this suggests is that a more modest evaluation
may be suitable, concerned more with efficiency
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and effectiveness. As can be seen from Figures 2
and 3, we are likely to be interested in this case in
process indicators rather than outcome indica-
tors. There are two approaches. The first approach
is to look at counterpart fund management directly,
building on the guidelines in Figure 1. The second
is to look at the management of the policy dialogue
and public expenditure process more generally,
following the 'new wave' approach to CPF
To begin with the management of counterpart
funds, an evaluation should begin by assembling
descriptive information: the policy framework gov-
erning CPF, the mechanism and timeliness of CPF
generation, the total value, how this compared to
Figure 2 Logical framework for a project involving earmarking of CPF
and no policy dialogue
Intervention
logic
Objectively
verifiable
indicators
Sources of
verification
Assumptions
Overall Poverty Income and National Benefits are
objective reduction asset-holding surveys, project not captured
of poor people studies by rich
Project Increased Crop and National Technologies
purpose agricultural
output and
better health
etc...
livestock
production,
employment,
health status
agricultural,
nutrition, health
surveys, project
studies
are appropriate;
pricing is
suitable
Results Completion of Details of Project reports No serious
roads, extension physical delays in project
centres, health
posts etc...
outputs Implementation
Activities 1. Mobilize 1. Details of 1. Donor and Donors provide
counterpart funds credited Government resources on
funds from to CPF accounting time; sales
sales of foreign
exchange or
accounts reports procedure works
smoothly
commodity aid
2. Undertake
rural
development
projects
2. Details of
project
activities
2. Project
reports
total money supply and the government budget,
how CPF were disbursed, and when. Beyond the
purely descriptive information, Figure 1 allows a
performance check-list to be applied to the man-
agement of CPF in a particular country This is set
out in Figure 4. The check-list builds on the van-
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ous guidelines to set normative standards: for
example, there should be evidence of 'an agreed
policy framework', that commodities sold were
'valued at the full cif price', and that they were
'credited within three months to an agreed account'.
A partial example of the application of the principle
Figure 3 Logical framework for a project not involving earmarking of
CPF and policy dialogue
Intervention Objectively Sources of Assumptions
logic verifiable verification
indicators
Overall Poverty Income and National Benefits are
objective reduction asset-holding surveys, project not captured
of poor people studies by rich
Project
purpose
Those affected
by government
and NGO
activity benefit
Results 1. Projects
and recurrent
activities
undertaken by
government
and NGOs
Activities 1. Mobilize
counterpart
funds from
sales of foreign
exchange or
commodity aid
2. Agree
Government
capital and
recurrent
budgets
Beneficiary
incidence
analysis of
public and NGO
expenditure
1, Annual
reports of
government
ministries
and NGOs
Details of
funds credited
to CPF
accounts
Formal
agreement
on budget
Formal
agreement
on Policy
Framework
Paper (PFP)
or similar
Special
studies
Review of
reports by
Government
and donors
Donor and
Government
accounting
reports
Reports
of joint donor-
government
committees
or evaluation
missions
PEP
Projects are
successfully
implemented
and reach
those intended
Budget
procedures
adequate and
effective for
disbursement
of funds
Donors provide
resources on
time; sales
procedure works
smoothly
Government
and donors
agree on
spending
priorities
Government
and donors
agree on policies
2. Annual
2. Policy reviews by
environment Government
improved and donors
of such performance indicators to EC Counterpart
Fund accounting practices in the early 1990s is in
Figure 5.
A more difficult task is to define performance indi-
cators for bilateral donor contributions to and
participation in policy dialogue and Public
Expenditure Reviews (PERs), either in general or
at the sectoral level. There is a large literature on
public expenditure and policy conditionality
(Premchand 1990, Ferroni and Kanbur 1990,
Mosely et al. 1991, IDS 1994); but, so far, rather lit-
tle has been written on the experience of bilateral
donors.
In the case of PERs, an obvious solution would be
to identify outcome indicators, at least intermediate
indicators like the share of public expenditure
devoted to social sectors, and the composition of
spending within those sectors (IDS 1994). Unfor-
tunately, this is problematic, for several reasons
(IDS ibid., Toye and Jackson 1996): budget alloca-
tions may be a poor guide to actual expenditure;
changes in taxation may mean that even budget
expenditures are a poor guide to overall fiscal
impact (for example, higher budget allocations may
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be counter-balanced by the introduction of user
charges); the share of public expenditure devoted
to different sectors says little about the overall level
of spending, since the share of GDP in the public
sector varies markedly; and, in any case, optimal
budget allocations are highly country specific.
Although this is the area where most attention
has been focused, I think it is a red herring for
our purposes.
An alternative approach is to look more closely at
the process of agreeing policy and public expendi-
ture, in other words to shift down a level in the
logical framework, and focus on efficiency rather
than effectiveness. Recent literature does suggest
that performance standards are available, though
policy dialogue remains a complex game between
donor and recipient (Mosley et al. 1991). The situ-
ation has become more complex as policy dialogue
has shifted from economic policy to wider political
issues (Stokke 1995).
For example, IDS (1994) recommended improve-
ments to the preparation of PERS in relation to
poverty reduction: a focus on actual expenditure,
as well as ex-ante allocations; preparation of the PER
Figure 4 The management of counterpart funds: performance indicators
Clear statement of budget priorities in project agreement
Provision for multi-year agreement
Explicit links to other aid
Possibility of substitution actions' where appropriate
Agreed policy framework
Regular monitoring schedule
Fully accounted in the national budget of the recipient
Collected and credited within three months to an agreed account
Agreed account a multi-donor account
Valued at full cit price
CPF account interest-bearing
Disbursed within 12 months
Management arrangements simple and flexible
Ex-post evaluation carried out
by recipient country governments; a process to
build consensus around public expenditure deci-
sions, perhaps by means of hearings by the legisla-
ture; and more distributional analysis of public
expenditure, including from a gender perspective
(see also Goetz 1995).
Along similar lines, a recent paper for the SPA iden-
tifies six criteria for successful sector investment
programmes: sector-wide in scope; a coherent
sector policy framework; local stakeholders in the
driver's seat; all donors sign on; common imple-
mentation arrangements; and minimal long-term
technical assistance (SPA 1995).
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Finally, Foster (1995) has summarized the require-
ments for successful donor conditionality: 'condi-
tions should be few in number, should usually
focus on protecting budget shares rather than
absolute spending levels, must be consistent with
the budget and with any medium-term budget
framework, ought to represent an agreement
reached between Government and the donors, and
need regular updating' (Foster 1995: 3.14).
An important issue has been about the relationship
between bilateral donors and the BWI. Here, too,
there are pitfalls. PERS are normally the responsi-
bility of the World Bank, occasionally with limited
Source: Maxwell with Owens (1991: 9
Figure 5 EC counterpart fund accounting practices (based on a sample
of 18 countries)
Number of Per cent of
countries countries
(a) Basic Data
1 With Food Aid 16 89
2 With SIP/GIP 13 72
3 With SIP/GIP and FoodAid 11 61
(b) Valuation
At World Price
4 For Food Aid 9 56
5 For SIP/GIP 10 78
Deductions allowed
6 For FoodAid 11 73
7 For SIP/GIP 14 33
(c) Management
8 Multi-year agreement 3 16
9 Ex-Ante Agreement 15 83
10 Management Committee 16 89
11 Special CF Unit 5 27
12 Monitoring and Evaluation 12 67
13 Single ECAccount 16 89
14 Meet Food Aid 3 19
Deposit Deadline
15 Meet SIP/GIP 6 46
Deposit Deadline
donor participation, and this usually in a technical
capacity For example, a donor may fund a member
of a mission, who is a specialist in one of the sectors
being considered. Foster notes that 'the donor
community has generally taken the view that there
can only be one adjustment programme, on which
the Bank and the Fund lead, and that other donors
should not impose conditions going beyond those
in Bank and Fund programmes' (ibid. 3.15). If a
donor is happy with the basic policy orientation of
the Bank, there is no problem. If, on the other
hand, policy differences do exist, then a donor may
find itself generating CPF to support projects of
which it does not approve.
The problem of donor coordination has been recog-
nized in the literature on CPF For example, Goreux
(1990) argues that various degrees of involvement
in the budget process are possible, ranging from
total reliance on the World BankfIMF, to participa-
tion in budgetary supervision, to a more equal part-
nership in helping to design public expenditure
programmes.
This suggests that in many respects, the critical
relationship is not the one between the donor and
the government of the recipient country, but
rather that between the bilateral donor and the
Bank. The donor will need its own perspective on
the size and content of the budget, and will need
to decide how far to participate in a policy dia-
logue on the topic. This may be at the sectoral
level: for example, food aid donors frequently use
programme food aid as a vehicle for policy dia-
logue and conditionality in the cereal sector.
However, decisions cannot be left to the last
minute, and require continual analysis and evalu-
ation (see also van der Windt 1995).
At the same time, the performance of the recipient
Government itself is central to the public expendi-
ture process, as the guidelines in Figure 1 empha-
sized. One objective for bilateral donors is to
ensure that the Government is equipped to prepare
PERS. This requires analytical and administrative
capacity in the Treasury, not only for budget prepa-
ration, but also for ex-post accounting.
r
am grateful to Ricardo Rosero at ISS for carrying Out
the review on which this and the following paragraph
are based.
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So, we are left with the question, what would con-
stitute a successful donor performance with regard
to the PER process? Figure 6 proposes some indica-
tors. They include: evidence that the donor has
satisfied itself that recipient budget processes are
policy-related, open, accountable and efficient; pro-
cedures for reviewing the budget at general or sec-
toral level, preferably in conjunction with other
donors; and explicit decisions about whether and in
what capacity to participate in Bank-led PERS.
6 Conclusion
Unfortunately, recent programme aid evaluations
appear to pay relatively little attention to evaluating
the effectiveness and efficiency of counterpart
funds, either in the narrow sense represented by
Figure 4, or in the wider and more interesting sense
represented by Figure 6. The published evaluations
of programme aid, and those of country experience
specifically carried out for the project of which this
paper forms part (Rosero and White 1995) contain
very little of the information needed to complete
Figure 4, and effectively none of that required to
complete Figure 6. This may partly be because the
evaluation studies did not investigate the issues, but
is more plausibly because the topics covered in the
two Figures do not form part of the planning and
implementation of programme aid.'
The information that is available suggests that the
most frequently reported performance indicator is
the collection rate for counterpart funds (item 8 of
Figure 4), estimated to be available in one third of
evaluations. Otherwise, there is patchy discussion
of valuation, accounting and internal management.
In some cases, donors have simplified management
(and evaluation) by introducing retroactive financ-
ing, which obviates the need for attention to collec-
tion rates or valuation. But generally, the lesson of
the review of current studies is that effectiveness
and efficiency evaluations have been neglected by
donors. This is a task for the future.
lt does seem to be a task worth carrying out, how-
ever. To paraphrase Mark Twain, rumours of the
death of counterpart fund earmarking are some-
what exaggerated. Nevertheless, movement is in
the right direction, not just in policy statements and
guidelines, but also in practice. This simplifies the
evaluation process. Less attention can be paid to
the nuts and bolts of generating and managing
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counterpart funds, more to the larger question of
policy dialogue and public expenditure manage-
ment. Here, however, we have been lacking perfor-
mance indicators for evaluation. Can we now agree
what these should be?
Figure 6 Participation in the PER: donor performance indicators
Evidence that the donor has satisfied itself as to the adequacy of the
Government budget-making and accounting capacity, including the preparation of
policy statements and participation by civil society in the public expenditure
process, and offered support if necessary
A procedure established by the donor for reviewing the size and composition of
recipient government expenditure, capital and recurrent and planned and actual,
at either general or sectoral level, in relation to its own objectives
A procedure established for feeding donor views into Government decision
making
Evidence that donor views are being communicated to the Government and the
World Bank.
An explicit annual decision on whether to participate in World Bank - led PER
and in what capacity
Evidence that aid allocations reflect outcome of the PER and Government
budgetary process
Evidence of continual updating and review
Evidence of donor coordination on the above
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